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Introduction 
The notion of metonymy, gaining its name from two Greek particles, i.e. 
meta – ‘after’, ‘later’ and ònyma/ònoma – ‘name’, ‘word’ first appeared in the 
antiquity, where it was considered one of the four figures of speech, or rhetorical 
tropes,  together  with  metaphor,  synecdoche  and  irony.  Today  metonymy  is 
frequently  discussed  in  connection  with  metaphor,  as  two  closely  connected 
phenomena,  whereas  synecdoche,  i.e.  ‘part  for  the  whole’  –  pars  pro  toto
relation, is generally subsumed within the notion of metonymy. In accordance 
with the classical, rhetorical approach metonymy is broadly defined as a device 
in which the name of one entity stands for another one by association of ideas 
(cf.  Rayevska  1979,  Ullmann  1957).  The  assumptions  characteristic  for  the 
rhetorical approach are as follows:  
1) metonymy is a figure of speech, thus a matter of literary, ornamental 
language; 
2) metonymy relies on linguistic substitution, i.e. substitution of names; 
3) metonymy is a ‘stand for’ relationship between two words, based on 
physical contiguity or proximity of the entities denoted; 
4) contiguity  is  understood  in  a  broad  sense  and  comprises  spatial 
contact, temporal proximity, casual relations, part-whole relations, etc.  
In present-day linguistic analysis, after years of a relative neglect, one may 
speak of a certain revival of interest in the study of metonymy. In the last decade of 
the 20
th century metonymy attracted the interest of cognitive semanticists, who 
have gone far beyond the traditional view in several ways. With this in mind, the 
aim set to this paper is to reconsider the notion of metonymy in linguistics, with 170
due attention to a selection of current views and approaches. Nevertheless, before 
relevant issues are presented, a brief explanation of terminology introduced to 
account for the novel view seems indispensable. The basic notion in discussing 
both the mechanisms of metonymy and metaphor in cognitive semantics is the 
notion  of  domain,  frequently  referred  to  as  the  Idealized  Cognitive  Model
(henceforth:  ICM).  However,  despite  the  central  role  of  these  terms  in  the 
cognitivist debate, their definition remains fairly ambiguous. In general, domains 
are  to  be  understood  as  coherent  regions  of  human  conceptual  space,  being 
organisational units of the encyclopaedic knowledge about a concept. To be more 
specific, Croft and Cruse (2004:15) provide a more precise definition, based on the 
assumptions made by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Langacker (1987), defining 
domain as a semantic structure that functions as the base for at least one concept 
profile, typically many profiles. A profile and a base are to be understood as parts 
of a concept, in such a way that the base presupposes the existence of any profile 
and  is,  consequently,  prerequisite  for  its  conceptualisation.  In  cognitivist 
discussion, the term domain is often further qualified by means of such adjectives 
as cognitive or conceptual (e.g. Kleparski 1997). In addition, apart from the terms 
domain or ICM, the terms frame (e.g. Papafragou 1996, Koch 2004) or schema
(Lakoff  and Turner  1989)  are  currently employed to account for more or less 
similar  mental  constructs.  Another  two  terms  frequently  appearing  in  the 
discussion of metonymies from the cognitive viewpoint are a vehicle (or source) 
and  target.  The  notion  of  vehicle  is  understood  as  an  entity  initiating  the 
metonymic process, whereas the concept of target stands for the entity aimed at by 
means of metonymy.  
Metonymy in communication 
One  may  say  that  metonymy,  judging  by  its  widespread  occurrence  in 
natural languages, fulfils important functions in everyday communication. The 
questions that appear in this context are, first of all: Why and how do speakers 
encode meaning in a metonymic way? and secondly, How do hearers arrive at 
the relevant interpretation? 
Starting with the first question, most importantly metonymy has a referential 
function,  and  there  are  several  pragmatic  reasons  for  the  referential  use  of 
metonymies. According to Nerlich, Clarke and Todd (1999:362), metonymy is an 
abbreviation  device  which  allows  us  to  […]  say  things  quicker,  to  shorten 
conceptual distances. In other words, due to the use of metonymic expressions 
speakers  are  capable  of  limiting  the  number  of  referents.  In  this  way,  for 
example, the word form school contextually comes to refer to an institution, 
whose existence is determined by a number of components, like for instance 
lessons, staff, schoolyear, etc. Frequently, explicit reference to these components 171
is superfluous, or even their usage would necessitate in introduction of many 
further referents (Dirven 1993:22).  
What  is  more,  referential  metonymy  often  proves  to  be  the  only 
unambiguous expression, in comparison to particular paraphrases, even though 
apparently it may seem vague and imprecise, e.g.: Different parts of the country 
don’t necessarily mean the same thing when they use the same word (Dirven 
1993:6). Here, the phrase different parts of the country, which is interpreted 
metonymically in the context of the rest of the utterance, combines the meanings 
of  particular  geographical  areas  with  individual  inhabitants.  A  possible 
paraphrase like People living in different parts of the country don’t […] would 
put more emphasis on individuals than on the regional variation, which – to 
some  extent  –  changes  the  original  interpretation  inherent  in  the  metonymic 
phrase. Similarly, a paraphrase In different parts of the country people don’t 
[…], would highlight the regional rather than individual variation. 
Thirdly, by means of metonymy, the danger of ambiguity can be avoided as 
to which part of the referent’s meaning is considered the most relevant. For 
instance, the phrase the Crown, as used in The Crown has not withheld its assent 
to  a  Bill  since  1707  (Dirven  1993:17),  suggests  that  what  is  meant  is  the 
institution, whereas the person, i.e. monarch is totally irrelevant. 
The  answer  to  the  question  of  how  speakers  encode  meaning  in  the 
metonymic way must rely on the discussion of entities that are chosen to serve 
as vehicles to give access to required targets. In an attempt to deal with this 
question Kövecses and Radden (1998:62–71) specify what the authors refer to 
as principles of relative salience, i.e. principles determining the natural cases of 
metonymy. The authors differentiate between principles having a cognitive basis 
and communicative principles. The cognitive principles are determined by three 
general  determinants  of  conceptual  organisation,  namely  human  experience, 
perceptual selectivity and cultural preference. The human experiences, derived 
from the anthropocentric view of world and our interaction with the world, lead 
to the following principles for choosing the vehicle entities: 
HUMAN OVER NON-HUMAN, 
CONCRETE OVER ABSTRACT, 
INTERACTIONAL OVER NON-INTERACTIONAL, 
FUNCTIONAL OVER NON-FUNCTIONAL.
On  the  other  hand,  the  perceptual  selectivity  accounts  for  the  following 
principles: 
IMMEDIATE OVER NON-IMMEDIATE, 
OCCURENT OVER NON-OCCURENT, 
MORE OVER LESS, 172
DOMINANT OVER LESS DOMINANT, 
GOOD GESTALT OVER POOR GESTALT, 
BOUNDED OVER UNBOUNDED,  
SPECIFIC OVER GENERIC.
Thirdly, cultural preferences result in the following principles:  
STEREOTYPICAL OVER NONSTEREOTYPICAL, 
IDEAL OVER NON-IDEAL, 
TYPICAL OVER NONTYPICAL, 
CENTRAL OVER PERIPHERAL, 
BASIC OVER NONBASIC,  
IMPORTANT OVER LESS IMPORTANT, 
COMMON OVER LESS COMMON,  
RARE OVER LESS RARE.  
Finally, communicative principles relevant for the choice of the preferred 
vehicle, as distinguished by Kövecses and Radden (1998), are: 
CLEAR OVER LESS CLEAR, 
RELEVANT OVER IRRELEVANT.  
Notice that the former of the two principles is clearly a counterpart of Grice’s 
(1975) maxim of manner, whereas the latter one relies on Sperber and Wilson’s 
(1995) principle of relevance. At first sight, the reconciliation of the two principles 
might seem unfeasible. Nevertheless, as Langacker (1993:30) puts it:  
 […] metonymy allows an efficient reconciliation of two conflicting factors: the need to be 
accurate, i.e. of being sure that the addressee’s attention is directed to the target; and our natural 
inclination to think and talk explicitly about those entities that have the greatest cognitive salience 
for us.  
Thus,  by  means  of  metonymy,  two  apparently  conflicting  aims  can  be 
achieved,  namely  accuracy  and  economy  of  speech.  Furthermore,  the 
communicative  principles  of  clarity  and relevance simultaneously provide an 
answer to the last one of the three questions posed in this subsection. They 
account not only for the process of encoding, but also of decoding the meaning 
of an utterance.  
The nature of metonymy 
Our present-day discussion of metonymy reveals both similarities as well as 
differences in the treatment of the notion in question. To start with similarities, 173
first and foremost the linguists’ interest has ceased to be restricted to literary 
language. At present a great deal of research is conducted with regard to every-
day discourse, where – in fact – metonymy refers to a wide range of language 
phenomena.  Secondly,  metonymy  is  no  longer  viewed  solely  as  a  figure  of 
speech and thus a characteristic of language in terms of relations among words 
alone. Instead, the grounding of metonymy in the human conceptual system, i.e. 
thought  processes,  is  universally  stressed.  This  prominent  feature  of  the 
mechanism  of  metonymy  was  first  stated  directly  by  Lakoff  and  Johnson 
(1980:39),  considered  pioneers  of  the  novel  approach,  who  underlined  that 
metonymic concepts structure language, thoughts, attitudes and actions, and are 
grounded in our experience. What follows; at present metonymy is considered a 
conceptual operation rather than a mere ‘stand for’ substitution relationship. As 
a result, contiguity, a crucial notion in dealing with metonymy, is perceived in 
mental rather than in physical terms, which is occasionally stressed by the term 
conceptual contiguity (e.g. Dirven 1993).  
In  accordance  with  the  standard  definition  within  the  framework  of 
cognitivism,  as  advocated  by,  among  others,  Lakoff  and  Turner  (1989), 
metonymy  is  perceived  as  […]  a  mapping  [conceptual  projection]  with  a 
primarily  referential  purpose,  in  which  the  source  and  target  entities  are 
conceptual  entities  in  the  same  domain  (Strazny  2005:681).  The  unity  of 
domain  (ICM,  frame)  seems  to  be  another  similarity  in  the  treatment  of 
metonymy  by  individual  linguists.  This  feature  is  supposed  to  distinguish 
metonymy from metaphor, where the defining property is concept mapping 
between two domains. Nevertheless, despite the apparently common consent 
to the fact that metonymic processes operate within one conceptual construct, 
some differences, resulting mainly from the ambiguous status of the notion of 
domain  itself,  can  be  observed.  Thus,  according  to  Croft  (1993:348), 
metonymic mapping does not necessarily occur within a single domain, but 
may  also  take  place  in  a  single  domain  matrix,  with  the  domain  matrix 
understood  as  a  combination  of  domains  presupposed  by  a  single  concept. 
This  suggestion  is  justified  by  the  fact  that  a  concept  may  simultaneously 
presuppose several different dimensions, which in turn can be interpreted as 
different  domains  forming  a  domain  matrix.  Dirven  (1993:9)  distinguishes 
three types of metonymies with one of them, the inclusive syntagm, operating 
within two different domains or two different aspects of a domain. Since the 
involvement of two domains seems to blur the distinction between metonymy 
and metaphor, Dirven (1993:14) clarifies that in metonymy the two domains 
remain intact, whereas in metaphor the source domain is totally suppressed. 
However, as the author aptly notes, the division of extralinguistic reality is not 
objective but rather it depends on the language user’s cultural background, 
which in turn determines the existence of one or more domains for a given 
concept. Thus, the question of a number of domains is basically a matter of 174
perspectivisation,
1  and  in  metonymy,  given  experiential  areas  are  merely 
perspectivised as one domain or more domains. Consequently, the conceptual 
contiguity between two elements, forming the base of metonymic relations, 
must be perceived as constituted by a conceptual act rather than the objective 
reality.  Within  the  frame  semantics,  where  metonymy  is  defined  as  frame-
based  figure/ground  effect  with  respect  to  an  invariant  meaning  (Koch 
2004:8),  contiguity  is  considered  to  hold  on  two  levels,  namely  between 
elements of a frame, as well as between one element and the frame as a whole.  
Due  to  the  fact  that  metonymy  does  not  actually  seem  to  consist  of 
systematic  mappings,  some  linguists  refrain  from  treating  it  as  a  mapping 
process. Instead, a ‘reference point’ approach is suggested, as in the following 
definition:  
Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental 
access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model (Radden 
and Kövecses 2005). 
Thus, for example, in the sentence She’s just a pretty face, the element pretty 
face functions as the vehicle which by means of mental activation allows to 
access the ‘person’ as the target (Radden and Kövecses, 2005). The definition 
quoted  above  relies  on  the  ‘access  node’  model  of  meaning  proposed  by 
Langacker (1987), in which a word form serves as a point of access to a network 
of open-ended relations, i.e. cognitive routines, constituting its meaning.  
Despite the popularity of the reference-point approach (e.g. Lakoff 1987, 
Langacker 1993, Panther and Radden 1999, or Dirven and Pörings 2002), the 
above  model  draws  criticism  as  well.  According  to  Panther  and  Thornburg 
(2005:43), who rely on both the cognitivist and relevance theories in their model 
of metonymy, the reference-point approach seems too unrestrained, classifying 
data as metonymic that cannot be treated as prototypical cases of metonymy. The 
authors illustrate their claim with the following pair of sentences:  
a) The trumpet put me in a bad mood. 
b) The loss of my wallet put me in a bad mood.  
Thus, although in b) the loss of my wallet seems to provide access to the 
concept of NON-POSSESSION (of the wallet), it is a conceptually necessary and 
thus a non-metonymic relationship. By contrast, the trumpet does not necessarily 
entail  THE  SOUND  OF  THE  TRUMPET,  which  makes  it  a  metonymic 
relationship.  Consequently,  Panther  and Thornburg (2005:50) distinguish two 
essential  and  –  in  their  view  –  defining  properties  of  metonymy,  namely 
1  For  a  slightly  different  understanding  of  the  notion  of  perspectivisation  see  Kleparski 
(1997). 175
contingence and the degree of conceptual prominence of the target meaning. 
Contingence  is  defined  as  a  conceptually  non-necessary  relation  between 
concepts, i.e. relation that is in principle defeasible (see Panther and Thornburg 
2005:46).  The  latter  property,  that  is  conceptual  prominence,  leads  to  a 
conclusion that the traditional ‘stand for’ metonymic relation, where the target 
meaning is maximally prominent, is a borderline case of metonymy rather than a 
prototype. The basic metonymic relation, as viewed by Panther and Thornburg 
(2005),  differs  slightly  from  the  definition  coined  by  Radden  and  Kövecses 
(2005), and can be presented in form of the following Figure 1: 
Figure 1. The basic metonymic relation (Panther and Thornburg 2005:42)
Unlike Radden and Kövecses (2005), Panther and Thornburg (2005) draw a 
line of distinction between the vehicle, as a linguistic form, and source meaning 
as  the  part  of  meaning  inherent  in  the  vehicle  triggering  the  particular 
metonymic  process.  What  is  more,  the  diagram  shows  that  in  the  concept 
formation the source meaning is not wiped out by the target meaning. Thus, 
although the target meaning is more prominent, the source meaning must be 
salient  enough  to  enable  its  activation.  In  a  similar  way,  Dirven  (1993:21) 
observes  that  in  metonymy  two  elements  keep  their  existence  and  form  a 
contiguous system.  
In modern literature metonymy is also defined as a variety of echoic use 
(Papafragou 1996, and website). Within the framework of the relevance theory, 
the echoic use is understood as a kind of self-referring, interpretative linguistic 
expression  falling  outside  its  normal  descriptive  denotation.  In  Papafragou’s 
(1996) view, ad hoc metonymic concepts are formed within the complex system 
of relations found in a frame. Thus, they rely on the set of attributes and values 
characterising a particular expression, and capture the multitude of assumptions 
humans possess (cf. Kleparski 1997). The echoic expression produces the novel 
concept through some particularly accessible value. According to Papafragou 
(1996:176),  metonymy  must  be  considered  a  novel  conceptualisation  of  an 
external entity rather than a mapping between two concepts. Consequently, in 176
metonymy the descriptive content of the expression is not necessarily attributed 
or attributable to a previous source. 
To  explain  the  gist  of  the  metonymic  process  from  the  cognitivistic 
perspective, Croft (1993:348) speaks of an effect called domain highlighting, i.e. 
making  primary  a  domain  that  is  secondary  in  the  literal  meaning.
2  This 
occurrence of this process is facilitated due to the salience of some elements 
present within the domain matrix for a given concept, even if they are peripheral 
to the concept’s literal meaning. For example, the works of Proust are definitely 
external to the concept PROUST in comparison to the fact that he was a person. 
Nevertheless, since Proust as a person gained fame due to his works, the domain 
matrix must include the CREATIVE ACTIVITY domain, where the WORKS BY 
PROUST are salient enough to initiate a metonymic shift. As Croft (1993:349) 
remarks,  domain  highlighting  seems  to  be  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient 
condition for metonymy.  
Another  attempt  to  specify  the  process  of  meaning  shift  by  means  of 
metonymic extension was, for example, made by Taylor (1990) and Kleparski 
(1997),  who  treat  metonymic  meaning  changes  as  special  cases  of 
perspectivisation within conceptual domains (henceforth: CDs). As viewed by 
the  latter  author,  the  notion  of  CD  entails  the  existence  of  attributive  paths 
against which attributive values, forming an open set, are specified (cf. Seto’s 
notion of exploiting connections, 1999). The lexical categories are characterised 
relative  to  different  locations  within  the  attributive  paths  of  CDs. 
Perspectivisation is understood as a process by means of which some attributive 
values, whether overtly present or not, are foregrounded whereas others become 
backgrounded or even disappear completely. 
Types of metonymic relations 
The  problem  of  classification  of  metonymic  relations  has  attracted  the 
interest of a number of students of language. For the purpose of brevity, only the 
general principles underlying selected classifications, rather than their details, 
can be included here.  
In accordance with the cognitivist approach to the mechanism of metonymy, 
the crucial issue in the presentation of classificatory schemes is first of all the 
identification  and  description  of  conceptual  structures  that  can  result  in 
conventional  metonymic  relations.  A  typology  of  metonymy-producing 
relationships was, among others, worked out by Radden and Kövesces (1998, 
2005), who primarily base their presentation on the distinction between whole 
2  The  notion  of  highlighting  understood  in  a  similar  way  by  other  authors,  such  as,  for 
example, Kleparski (1997), Kiełtyka (2005) and Kiełtyka (in preparation). 177
and  parts. The  approach  results  from  the  assumption  that  human  knowledge 
about the world is organised by structured ICMs, which are perceived by people 
as  wholes  with  parts.  Thus,  the  two  basic  conceptual  configurations 
distinguished are: 1) Whole ICM and its part(s); 2) Parts of an ICM. Within the 
first configuration the following ICMs are listed as being capable of giving rise 
to metonymy producing relationships: 
Thing-and-Part ICM,  
Scale ICM, 
Constitution ICM,  
Event ICM, 
Category-and-Member ICM, 
Category-and-Property ICM, 
Reduction ICM. 
Metonymies  relying  on  these  ICMs  apply  typically  to  things.  In  the  second 
configuration,  in  case  of  which  the  resulting  metonymies  normally  apply  to 
entities  within  an  event,  metonymy-producing  relationships  occur  in  the 
following ICMs: 
Action ICM, 
Perception ICM, 
Causation ICM, 
Production ICM, 
Control ICM,  
Possession ICM, 
Containment ICM, 
Location ICMs, 
Sign and Reference ICMs, 
Modification ICM.  
It has to be noted at this point that Radden and Kövesces (1998, 2005) attempt at 
specification  of  general  conceptual  categories,  referred  to  by  the  authors  as 
metonymy-producing  relationships,  within  which  they  identified  an  impressive 
number of actual metonymic relations. Thus, for example the Thing-and-Part ICM
is supposed to lead to two metonymic variants, namely WHOLE THING FOR A PART 
OF THE THING, and PART  OF A THING  FOR THE WHOLE THING. As far as the 
metonymies applying to events are concerned, the Action ICM includes, among 
others, AGENT FOR ACTIONor INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION metonymic relations. 
Dirven (1993) lists three types of metonymies, with a distinction based on 
the  dichotomy  between  syntagmatic  and  paradigmatic  relations.  Thus,  linear 
metonymies, which occur in linear linguistic context, i.e. phrases or sentences, 178
rely on the syntagmatic relationship of the metonymic element to the rest of the 
sentence, against which it is interpreted. As Dirven (1993:6) points out, this type 
of  metonymy  does  not  necessarily  result  in  a  shift  of  meaning.  Linear 
metonymies  belong  to  the  so-called  low-level  metonymies,  of  which  typical 
examples  are:  LOCALITY  FOR  INSTITUTION,  INSTITUTION  FOR 
PEOPLE, CONTAINER FOR FOOD, PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT, etc. 
The second type of metonymy is the conjunctive syntagm, which depends on 
non-linguistic syntagmatic relations, e.g. cultural context. Notice that this type 
of metonymy entails an obligatory change in meaning. Nevertheless, as Dirven 
(1993:8)  claims,  conjunctive  syntagm  operates  on  a  cluster  of  contiguous 
domains, and thus the relationship does not exhibit figurative interpretation. In 
case of the conjunctive syntagm the shift in meaning is systematic, which is 
demonstrated evidently in dictionary entries. The inclusive syntagm, which is 
the third type of metonymy as listed by the author, relies on a chain of inclusion 
and, like the previous type, it has non-linguistic syntagmatic nature. One of the 
main features of this type of metonymy is that this metonymy is characterised by 
different degrees in figurativity. In fact, the varying degree in figurativity is, 
according to Dirven (1993:15–16), a differentiating feature between metonymy 
and metaphor. Thus, linear metonymy, which is non-figurative, can be placed on 
the  one  end  of  a  scale,  whereas  the  other  end  of  the  scale  is  occupied  by 
metaphor, characterised by complex figurativity.  
Koch’s  (2004)  classification  of  metonymies  follows  as  a  corollary  of  a 
pragmatic and relevance-theoretic analysis of a number of metonymies, with the 
figure/ground effect, as well as dychotomies implicature versus explicature, and 
literalness vs. non-literalness serving as the base. In the diachronic perspective, 
Koch  (2004:14)  distinguishes  three  stages  of  metonymic  semantic  change 
resulting in the following set of metonymies: a) ad hoc metonymies relying on 
(universal) speech rules, b) conventional metonymies depending on (historical) 
discourse  rules,  and  c)  metonymic  polysemies  resulting  from  (historical) 
language use. In turn, within the ad hoc stage, which is claimed to be crucial for 
further  stages,  a  distinction  is  drawn  between  speaker-induced  and  hearer-
induced  metonymies,  with  two  types  of  speaker-induced  metonymies,  i.e. 
referent-oriented, and concept-oriented metonymies. Additionally, the concept-
oriented metonymies occur in both soft and intense versions. The hearer-induced 
metonymies are necessarily concept-oriented. 
Panther  and  Thornburg  (2005:37),  who  are  clearly  proponents  of  the 
pragmatic approach to meaning, claim that conceptual metonymies are natural 
inference schemas that serve as a basis for pragmatic reasoning on the levels of 
reference, predication and illocution. Consequently, they propose a classification 
of  metonymies  into  three  pragmatic  types,  i.e.  referential,  predicational  and 
illocutionary  metonymies.  In  fact,  a  significant  number  of  metonymic 
expressions, and thus metonymies, are motivated by speakers’ referential needs 179
(cf.  Dirven  1993).  In  addition  to  pragmatic  types of metonymy, Panther and 
Thornburg (2005:47–49) distinguish two kinds of coerced metonymies, namely 
constructionally and lexically coerced metonymies.  
Moreover,  metonymies  can  be  characterised  on  the  basis  of  semantic 
relations.  According  to  Bierwiaczonek  (2005:14),  the  metonymic  semantic 
relations rely on conceptual contiguity and probably strong neural links, which 
in turn lead to their activation. Furthermore, their co-activation is not necessary 
by definition (cf. Panther, Thornburg 2005). Thus, the taxonomy proposed by 
Bierwiaczonek  (2005)  includes:  meronymy-based  metonymy,  antonymy-based 
metonymy, complementarity-based metonymy, reversives-based metonymy, and 
synaesthesia-based metonymy. Within the group of meronymy-based metonymy, 
depending on the holonym and its parts, the author lists four subtypes, namely 
functional part-based metonymy, segmented part-based metonymy, script-based 
metonymy, and frame-based metonymy. What is more, Bierwiaczonek (2005:30) 
adds, even if hesitantly, metaphor-based metonymy to his taxonomy. The author 
claims that, providing the contiguity is defined in terms of strengths of synaptic 
connections between the neural circuits underlying concepts, even conceptual 
metaphor may be given a metonymic interpretation.  
Conclusion 
Summing up, the scissors-and-paste overview given in the foregoing pages 
merely  touches  upon  the  basic,  background  issues  relevant  for an up-to-date 
discussion of metonymy, without going into details of particular proposals. The 
common  ground  for  present  studies,  clearly  distinguishing  it  from  previous 
treatments,  seems  to  be  the  cognitive  orientation.  Nevertheless,  due  to  the 
mental  character  and  thus  mainly  intuitive  nature  of  studies,  which  are 
frequently based on a limited number of languages, the assumptions made by 
particular researchers are far from unanimous. Moreover, the above outline is 
devoted  mainly  to  the  theoretical  discussion  of  mental  strategies  of 
conceptualisation,  whereas  the  cognitive  approach  to  metonymy  provides  a
useful  framework  for  the  study  of  changes  in  lexicon,  surveying  processes 
resulting  from  metonymic  shift  both  in  the  diachronic  and  synchronic 
perspective. Last but not least, motivation of many grammatical structures may 
also be explained by means of metonymy.  
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